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 Dealing
With The Iranian Threat
West must keep pressure on...
[Patrick
Clawson] 10/26/05
Why does
the Iranian nuclear program pose such a threat to U.S. interests?
The first reason is the character of Islamic republic. Its
supreme leader states repeatedly that Israel should be wiped
off the earth, and such frightening statements are backed up
by the a long history of sponsoring terrorism. These include
the American embassy hostage taking, blowing up of U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut in 1983, and the blowing up of the Khobar
Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996. Iranian officials even admit
that key Al-Qaeda leaders are still on Iranian territory. While
Iran claims they are under arrest, these Al-Qaeda members were
still able to call Saudi Arabia to order bombings there.
Besides the
Islamic Republic itself, there are other reasons for concern
regarding Iran's nuclear aspirations. Arab countries in the
region do not have nuclear weapons, and are dissatisfied with
the status quo. If Iran acquired nuclear arms, it would provoke
a nuclear arms race in the region.
During the
Iran-Iraq War, for example, the Saudis bought long-range missiles
from the Chinese that it could arm with nuclear warheads. The
Saudis could easily keep Pakistani nuclear warheads on these
missiles and remain in compliance with the Non-Proliferation
Treaty by simply seeing that the Pakistanis had a key to the
nuclear warheads.
The Egyptians
might also decide that they want to match Iran's capabilities
and undertake a nuclear program. Such proliferation would encourage
other Arab countries to follow. Some in Turkey have already
begun reassessing the country's position within the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Iraq, too, may one day want to reassert itself.
For a country
like Iran, that does not have a direct, threatening enemy,
nuclear weapons do nothing to bolster the state's security
and instead would only bring more danger to itself through
the resulting arms race.
Iran claims
that the Non-Proliferation Treaty actually established its
right to nuclear technology. But under the treaty, such a right
is conditional on the state's cooperation with the IAEA. But
Iran has not been cooperating with the IAEA and has been lying
for the past eighteen years about its plans and technology,
and continues to do so. If it is permissible that Iran to break
the treaty, a negative precedent will be set for the rest of
the world, and especially for those countries that have expressed
desire to push forward with nuclear programs.
To reiterate,
it is important that we consider the Islamic Republic, the
arms race it would cause in the region, and the precedent it
would set for the world by disregarding the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
There are
two extreme solutions to the situation that have been suggested,
attack or appease, but both are unattractive.
Even if the
U.S. could locate and successfully knock out all its nuclear
arms, the Iranians would react and at the minimum want to redouble
their efforts. Iran has mastered all aspects of nuclear technology,
and with its regime remaining in place, it would certainly
rebuild. And it is implausible to try to militarily overthrow
the regime because, on top of the fact that American forces
are occupied elsewhere, the regime is supported by millions
of ideological extremists who would certainly undertake a massive
insurgency.
The other
solution would be to appease Iran with a grand bargain: Iran
gives up its nuclear program, and we agree to soft peddle further
protests to Iran's other objectionable activities. But this
too will not work. First, neither side trusts the other, especially
with the Iranian government's history of cheating on agreements.
Further, by striking a deal with Iran and not cracking down
on their other policies, the U.S. would send a terrible message
to the rest of the world. Iranians would most likely continue
to support terrorist organizations and suppress its citizens'
rights, demonstrating to people worldwide that the U.S. does
not really care about democracy and human liberties.
The best
option is the middle road: using influence, containment, and
deterrence. We want to show the Iranians that if they pursue
nuclear weapons, they will be worse off. One of the ways to
do this is through military measures, such as stepping up military
cooperation and military/naval presence in the Gulf region.
We could also threaten to sell weapons to Iraqis and Iran's
other neighbors. These actions would send the message to Iran
that their nuclear program is isolating them and creating an
arms race which they will lose.
There are
positive inducements we could use as well, such as exchanging
military observers with Iran to build greater confidence on
both sides and forming maritime agreement to prevent incident
at sea. Both measures proved successful in the Cold War.
But if Iran
continues on their course, the U.S. should work with European
allies to persuade the UN to use diplomatic measures. Isolating
Iran economically, however, is not a good idea. The oil sanctions
used against Iran did not work and are impractical, as we depend
too heavily on oil. But there are other types of sanctions
that we could use. If asked which sanctions had the greatest
impact politically, South Africans and Serbs would concur that
it was the symbolic sanction of banning participation in international
sporting events.
Iranians
are soccer crazy and had a day of national celebration when
they qualified to play in the World Cup. If Iran were banned
from participation in the World Cup, it would grab people's
attention. After mentioning this idea in an article, I received
a record number of death threats in one day.
There are
other diplomatic isolating steps that the U.S. can use, such
as banning the travel of key individuals associated with the
nuclear program, the country's leaders, and their respective
family members. Such measures have worked in the past. In October
2003, even though no officials expected it, Iran agreed to
suspend enrichment and conversion activities. The British,
French, and Germans had threatened Iran, and Iran complied
because they did not want to be isolated from rest of the world.
Iranians
will not give up their dreams, and if we stop showing interest
in the issue, they'll certainly pick it right back up again.
But if we are united in our efforts, the West can persuade
them to freeze their plans. tOR
Patrick
Clawson is deputy director for research of the Washington
Institute
for Near East Policy. He received his Ph.D. from the New School
for Social Research and is widely published. He is senior editor
of the Middle East Quarterly.
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