Guest
Contributor
Rick Russell
Richard
L. Russell is a Research Associate at the Institute for the
Study of Diplomacy and teaches in the Security Studies Program
at Georgetown University.
Coalition
Warfare in Iraq: Then and Now
Multilateral? Unilateral?...
[Rick Russell] 8/10/04
A common critique of the Bush administration's war in Iraq is
that George W. Bush failed to diplomatically harness as broad
a coalition as his father George H. W. Bush had in the 1990-91
Gulf War. This common wisdom holds that had the current President
been as much of a statesman as his father, the situation in Iraq
would be far more stable and certain than it is today. Rarely,
if ever, do the media, commentators or people on the street challenge
this common wisdom.
Pausing for
just a moment to peak behind the common mind's argument, however,
reveals that the coalition configuration that fought
against Saddam's regime last year and is now waging a counterinsurgency – against
what's left of Saddam's thugs among the Sunnis, the Shiite militant
movement catalyzed by Muqtada al-Sadr, al-Qaeda and other fundamentalist
Islamic zealots – is much the same as the coalition that
waged war against Iraq in 1991.
The 1990-91
war showcased a wide array of more than thirty countries that
contributed
forces to oust the Iraqi military from Kuwait,
but the burdens of waging war – as distinct from photo
opportunities – were carried by a lonely couple, the Americans
and the British. American and British forces spearheaded the
coalition drives into and around Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait.
The French, after much political controversy and turmoil in Paris,
eventually managed to dispatch a substantial force to the coalition.
To placate the French ego, their forces were assigned to holding
down an Iraqi airfield far from harm's way and the major thrusts
of American and British operations. The Germans, under a more
restrictive interpretation than today of their constitution sent
only a handful of trainer aircraft to Turkey.
Arab forces from Egypt, Syria and the Gulf Cooperation Council
added much political clout to the coalition, but little in the
way of proficient men or arms for waging war. Their major, if
not only, contribution in battle was to carry the Kuwaiti flag
into Kuwait City after it had been liberated by American and
British forces. The more significant contributions from the Arab
Gulf states came in the form of financial backing, the provision
of facilities and transit rights for the British and Americans
forces waging the campaign. Often overlooked today is that Arab
opposition to marching coalition forces into Iraqi territory
stymied any ambitious strategic thinking in Washington and London
to set the removal of Saddam's regime as the political objective
for Desert Storm.
Fast forward
to examine the current conflict in Iraq and a sense of déjà vu arises when examining the military contributions
to ousting Saddam's repugnant regime and the counterinsurgency
operations now underway. While the Bush Administration touts
some eighty coalition members contributing to the war on terror – a
figure that is near meaningless because it lumps token military
contributions to operations against al-Qaeda, in Afghanistan
and Iraq together – the number simply does not convey the
critical characteristics of the war in Iraq. Just as in the 1991
campaign, American and British forces spearheaded military operations
in the 2003 war to oust Saddam. The Americans made bold military
dashes to take Baghdad while the British ably secured Basra.
The absence of French and German military contributions mattered
little; just as their battlefield contributions to the first
Iraq war were negligible. Nor were Arab forces dispatched to
help the American and British spearheads given political sensitivities
and vulnerabilities reminiscent of those that caused Arab regimes
to fear any prospects for coalition operations inside Iraq during
the first Iraq war.
But American
and British forces did not use outer space as the staging point
for the
campaign against Saddam; they used received
logistics, command and control facilities, airspace transit rights,
port access and airbases to varying degrees from the Arab Gulf
States much as Washington and London had in the earlier war.
While many Gulf States publicly denounced American and British
war efforts in craven pandering to Arab public opinion, they
privately lent the support needed to wage the war. This reality
belies the common wisdom's false dichotomy that this war is "unilateral," contrasting
with the first Gulf war which was "multilateral."
Despite all
the confidence in the common mind about the strengths of coalition
warfare
of the first Iraq war and the weaknesses
of coalition warfare in the second Iraq war, there are more similarities
than differences. And calls for more "multinational" participation
in Iraq ring hallow against the political and military realities
of the region and international security. Europe's NATO members – save
the British – and Arab forces made few battlefield contributions
in the first Iraq war and are no more willing or able to contribute
militarily to the second Iraq war. Just as it was more than a
decade ago, the Americans and the British find themselves a lonely
couple waging "coalition" warfare in Iraq. CRO
Richard L. Russell is a Research Associate at the Institute
for the Study of Diplomacy and teaches in the Security Studies
Program at Georgetown University.
This
piece first appeared at In
The National Interest
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