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Chris Field- Contributor
Chris
Field is Editor of Human
Events Online [go
to Field index]
TWO
CENTS
 Not
So Serious On National Security
Here's How
Concerned Democrats Have Been...
[Chris Field] 3/14/05
In last
week's "Two Cents" I promised that this week
I would to go into greater detail about the lack of seriousness
Democrats have shown when it comes to our national security,
particularly our nuclear security. As if on cue, Senate Minority
Leader Harry Reid, one of several Democrats going into conniptions
over the nomination of John Bolton to be UN Ambassador, said, "Mr.
Bolton has overseen this Administration's flawed proliferation
policy that has seen North Korea quadruple its nuclear arsenal
and seen Iran take dangerous steps toward the development of
nuclear weapons." It's nice to know that the Democratic
Leadership is showing concern for our nuclear security, but their
concern was noticeably lacking just a few years ago. For example:
The nation's nuclear weapons laboratories are under the control
of the Department of Energy (DOE), as they have been since the
Department's inception. The Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratories in
New Mexico were the first of the nation's nuclear weapons labs
and were commissioned by the War Department in 1943 to house
the Manhattan Project. Since then, those laboratories have been
targets of espionage. The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA)
was created in 1999 to ensure the security of U.S. national nuclear
research and nuclear secrets.
In the Cox Report that was declassified in 1999, Americans learned
of a massive espionage program conducted by the People's Republic
of China (PRC) that resulted in the theft of virtually all of
the United States' nuclear weapons secrets from the Los Alamos
labs. In 1995, United States officials had evidence to suggest
that the PRC had acquired W-88 technology, which is for the United
States' most advanced nuclear warhead. Even though the DOE's
then-chief of intelligence rang alarm bells about possible Chinese
espionage, nobody in the senior management of the DOE or elsewhere
in the Clinton Administration seemed to care. The DOE did not
put in place any mechanisms other than spot checks to prevent
the removal of classified material, nor did it bother to tell
the FBI that its employee, Wen Ho Lee, whom the FBI suspected
of spying for China, had signed a privacy waiver which would
have allowed authorities to look at his computer. Rather, senior
DOE officials allowed Wen Ho Lee to continue to have access to
nuclear weapons secrets long after they knew he was an FBI suspect.
Later that year, then-Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary and the
Office of the Vice President were briefed on the Los Alamos espionage.
Then, in March of 1996, CIA Director Deutch was briefed, as
was National Security Advisor Berger in April of 1996, as to
the theft of the W-88 warhead information. In November of that
year, Deputy Secretary Charlie Curtis, who had investigated clear
indications of serious security and counterintelligence problems
at the DOE, drew up a list of initiatives and met with lab directors
and the head of DOE field offices to review foreign visitors
and counterintelligence programs -- his recommendations were
ignored by DOE laboratory bureaucrats and members of the Administration,
and subsequent Secretaries of Energy were never even told about
his plans. Intelligence officials continued their investigations,
developed a short list of suspects, and recommended a series
of measures to improve security. However, top Administration
officials and President Clinton stone-walled their efforts as
shown by the fact that security improvements were not even submitted
until the fall of 1998. One of the most disturbing allegations
came from Mr. Norta Trulock, who led the counterintelligence
effort for the DOE in response to the PRC espionage. He testified
before a House investigative committee that he had been ordered
by the acting Secretary of Energy, Betsy Moler, not to give information
to Congress on the espionage matter because she thought the information
would be used to criticize the Administration's China policy.
The Clinton Administration,
beyond any doubt, had information showing that China had stolen
the United States' most advanced
nuclear secrets, but it did not make public that information,
did not give Congress that information, and did not act on that
information. Instead, during this period of time President Clinton
was fighting congressional efforts to pressure China to enact
human rights, political, military, and trade reforms he was advocating
a policy of "constructive engagement" and calling China
the United States' "strategic partner." Also, at the
same time that he knew that China had very likely stolen the
plans for the W-88, President Clinton was fighting, with strong
opposition from many Members of Congress who had no idea of the
espionage, to loosen export controls on satellite and super-computer
sales to China. Thanks to those efforts by President Clinton,
China was able to build advanced guidance systems for its missiles
and to deploy multiple warheads on a single rocket. The Clinton
Administration's policy apparently was designed to pump American
money and technology into China to create a huge new malignant
communist superpower able to threaten the United States with
annihilation. Threaten it has -- including when it lobbed missiles
over Taiwan and warned the U.S. not to interfere if it did not
want to lose Los Angeles.
During all of this trial and tribulation, did the DOE implement
any of the security measures suggested by Curtis? No. In fact,
between the time that Curtis conducted his review for increased
security in 1996 and the time that a new counterintelligence
action plan was eventually submitted by Secretary Richardson
in November of 1998, there was nothing but turmoil: a number
of Energy Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries resigned; Curtis
left the DOE, his security initiatives ignored; Wen Ho Lee, whom
some in the FBI suspected of being a Chinese spy, was moved to
another position in which he was responsible for updating a computerized
archive of nuclear secrets; President Clinton and Attorney General
Reno were briefed by National Security Advisor Berger on W-88
technology theft and evidence of other Chinese espionage operations
which included the theft of neutron bomb data; President Clinton
publicly denied being briefed on the espionage; the Department
of Justice (DoJ) denied two FBI search warrant requests to search
Mr. Lee's property and denied permission for wiretaps; and the
FBI conducted a botched sting operation involving Mr. Lee.
As I mentioned last
week, following these events, two major actions were taken.
The first was the creation of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), led by former Senator
Rudman, to investigate the security needs at our nuclear laboratories.
The Rudman Report, "Science at its Best; Security at its
Worst," stated that the Board had found numerous problems
in security and overall safety of our nuclear secrets. Upon the
conclusion of the Board's investigation two major recommendations
were made:
1) The report said, "Specifically, we recommend that the
Congress pass and the President sign legislation that: Creates
a new, semi-autonomous Agency to oversee all nuclear weapons-related
matters previously housed in DOE";
2) The report recommended
streamlining the DOE weapons labs' management structure by
abolishing ties between the weapons labs
and all DOE regional, field, and site offices, and all contractor
intermediaries. The report specifically stated, "The Department
of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is
incapable of reforming itself. . . . Reorganization is clearly
warranted to resolve the many specific problems with security
and counter intelligence in the weapons laboratories, but also
to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic
throughout the entire Department. . . . eal and lasting security
and counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply
unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture."
The second major action was Congress' creation of the NNSA,
which was later adapted to comply directly with the PFIAB's recommendations,
but it did not happen without delays from the Clinton White House
and Democratic Congressmen. Despite the fact that our most sensitive
nuclear secrets were stolen by the PRC, that continued espionage
was still very possible, and that the need for a new security
entity was specifically called for by the President's own advisory
board, Democrats refused to support it. In May of 1999 Republicans
introduced an amendment that would have reorganized the DOE to
fix its security problems. Democrats filibustered that amendment.
At the time, they seemed to be more concerned with deflecting
blame from the Clinton team than they were with fixing the problems.
They were also intent upon trying to get concessions on a few
items in the Defense Authorization bill; in other words, they
attempted to barter with our nation's security. Thankfully, in
June of 1999, Republicans were finally able to convince Democrats
to stop making excuses and enact the needed structural reforms
necessary to protect our national nuclear secrets. Under that
legislation, the NNSA was created with clear lines of authority
and accountability, with the overarching goal being the establishment
of a clear chain of command for the Department's nuclear security.
In early June 2000, Americans learned of another massive breach
of nuclear security at Los Alamos. On Monday, June 12, it was
reported that two computer hard drives containing valuable nuclear
weapons data and other highly sensitive information were missing
from the Los Alamos National Laboratories. In total, 26 people
had access to those hard drives. Press reports indicated that
those hard drives contained American nuclear weapons data that
the Nuclear Emergency Search Team needs to disarm nuclear devices
during emergencies and intelligence information on the Russian
nuclear weapons program. In early May, a giant fire was moving
toward the laboratories. The DOE employees who had access to
the hard drives were told to remove them so that if the laboratories
were to fall victim to the fire, the information would not be
lost. On May 7, those employees entered the secured area to remove
the two hard drives, which were supposed to be stored in locked
containers in a vault at the X-Division at the laboratories.
The containers were found but the hard drives were gone and had
likely been missing for months. What the 26 members of this team
did after their discovery is rather interesting. They chose not
notify senior officials. They simply moved to another shelf where
duplicates of these hard drives were available, and they took
those. To make matters worse, they did not even begin an intensive
search until May 24, and, on June 11, DOE headquarters was finally
informed of the missing data. The law requires that any such
incident must be reported to the DOE within 8 hours, but these
people waited for three and a half weeks. Would authorities ever
have been notified had these people had the opportunity to make
replacements?
The major problem with security was the fact that the Clinton
Administration was less concerned with accountability than with
covering up the damage that was caused and passing the buck.
Not only were there delays from Democrats in Congress, but also
the Clinton White House, with a great deal of begging by Secretary
Richardson, seriously delayed actions. When Congress created
the NNSA Secretary Richardson did not like the idea of a new
semi-autonomous agency to monitor and enforce security or the
plan to streamline the DOE weapons labs management structure.
In fact, he tried to get the President to veto the Defense Authorization
bill which contained the NNSA language, but to no avail.
Frankly, what the Secretary or the Preisdent liked or didn't
like should have become moot when the President signed the bill,
but the Secretary continued to fight it, maintaining that he
should keep jurisdiction over the nuclear weapons program. The
President supported him by failing to nominate anyone to serve
as Under Secretary of the new agency, and Secretary Richardson
did virtually nothing to see that the new law was put into place.
He kept asserting that he was in charge and that the President
would hold him accountable for any lapses in security until an
Under Secretary was nominated and confirmed. Republicans urged
Secretary Richardson to cooperate and to allow Congress to put
someone else in charge of setting up the new agency, but he adamantly
refused because he wanted to do things his way. Well, America
saw where his way led.
Finally, in May 2000, President Clinton sent up the name of
General Gordon to become Under Secretary for Nuclear Security,
but the Senate could not vote to confirm him until mid-June.
Why the additional delay? Because Senate Democrats, at the request
of Secretary Richardson, were still trying to change the underlying
law. They were trying to get Congress to agree to make changes
in the law that were acceptable to the Energy Secretary so that
he could retain overall authority. It was not until the embarrassment
of the theft at Los Alamos that they at last agreed to vote on
the nomination.
Sadly, the incident at the Los Alamos laboratories was only
part of an all-too-familiar pattern with the Clinton Administration.
On April 7, 1995, President Clinton declassified all nuclear
information that was 25 years old or older and, in the rush to
take this action, gave away a great deal of information that
should not have been released. On July 31, 1995, it was found
that the Clinton Administration had leaked classified information
on the W-87 warhead to the media. The Administration overturned
DOE security decisions, including by reinstating staff who had
lost security clearances for compromising classified material.
It repeatedly harassed whistle-blowers who tried to prevent security
breaches, and it barred the use of color-coded security badges,
claiming that they are demeaning because they are discriminatory.
During the investigation of Chinese espionage in the Los Alamos
labs, President Clinton and the DoJ rejected FBI-requested wiretaps
on select espionage suspects. The White House granted waivers
to allow advanced missile technology to be given to China, which
China then used to develop multiple warhead guided missiles --
technology that was owned by the Loral Corporation, one of the
largest contributors to the Clinton campaign. President Clinton
also ended the Coordinating Committee for Multinational Export
Controls which had been set up so that the U.S. and our allies
could make determinations as to what should and should not be
shipped to potential adversaries. In December 1999, a Russian
diplomat was ordered to leave after a microphone transmitter
was discovered on the seventh floor of the State Department,
and a number of laptops were stolen from the State Department.
Former CIA Director John Deutch took classified material home
on his computer, while numerous people in the White House accessed
classified material without clearances. Felons, including a murderer,
received security clearances because one of the first things
the Clinton Administration did when it came to town in 1993 wa
s to put a hold on all FBI background checks. The Clinton White
House, in short, had a continuing disregard for protecting classified
information from its inception.
The Rudman Report
noted, "Never have the members of the
special investigative panel witnessed a bureaucratic culture
so thoroughly saturated with cynicism and disregard for authority."
That, dear readers, is how concerned Democrats have been in
the past about our national security. tOR
[This piece is adapted from a paper I wrote for the Senate Republican
Policy Committee in July 2000.]
copyright
2005 Human Events
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